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Clarifying “Wrongfulness” in Insanity Cases  
 
Kate E. Bloch & Jeffrey Gould1 
 
The “wrongfulness” test is a key approach to assessing legal 
insanity in most U.S. jurisdictions. It generally requires determining, 
inter alia, whether the accused knew or had the substantial capacity 
to appreciate that the acts were “wrongful” when the accused 
committed them.2 To assist the trier of fact in making that 
determination, courts and parties commonly invoke the acumen of 
forensic experts. To decide how to evaluate whether the accused met 
the requisite standard, the expert needs to understand the meaning 
that the law in the relevant jurisdiction assigns to the term 
“wrongful.” 
 
“Wrongfulness”: Range & Impact of Definitional Choices 
“Wrongfulness” has multiple meanings in insanity law. Over 
time, scholars and jurists have commonly identified three definitional 
categories: (1) “legal wrongfulness,” (2) “personal moral 
wrongfulness,” and (3) “societal moral wrongfulness.”3 “Legal 
wrongfulness” refers to whether the accused knew or had the 
substantial capacity to appreciate that the conduct in question 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Kate E. Bloch & Jeffrey Gould, 
Legal Indeterminacy in Insanity Cases: Clarifying Wrongfulness and 
Applying a Triadic Approach to Forensic Evaluations, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 
913 (2016). Please consult the original article for more detailed analysis, as 
well as footnotes and citations, most of which have been omitted for 
purposes of this summary. 
2. M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1943); MODEL 
PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments 1985). 
3. Definitions within the “legal wrongfulness” and “societal moral 
wrongfulness” categories are commonly applied in insanity law today. 
While issues related to “personal moral wrongfulness” may arise with some 
frequency for forensic experts during their assessments, and it is essential 
for professionals involved in determining, interpreting, and explaining the 
insanity standard to juries to understand this category and how it may differ 
from the others, it is not clear if “personal moral wrongfulness” continues to 
apply as a legally adopted insanity category in the U.S. today. 
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violated the law or was wrong in the sense of being criminal, 
although the accused does not need to know the name of the law or 
title of the crime. “Personal moral wrongfulness” refers to whether 
the accused knew or had the substantial capacity to appreciate that 
the conduct violated the accused’s own moral code. “Societal moral 
wrongfulness” refers to whether the accused knew or had the 
substantial capacity to appreciate that the conduct violated the moral 
code of society at large.  
Within two of these broad rubrics, “legal wrongfulness” and 
“societal moral wrongfulness,” there are several more nuanced 
permutations. With this range of available options, the definition may 
differ significantly among jurisdictions4 or perhaps not even be fully 
delineated within a jurisdiction. As a result, the expert may struggle 
to ascertain or decipher the meaning of “wrongful” that applies in a 
particular case or jurisdiction.  
Applying the legally incorrect definition of “wrongful” for that 
jurisdiction may produce insanity-evaluation results with verdict-
changing consequences. Imagine, for example, an individual, whom 
we will call “Jake,” who suffers from schizophrenia and experiences 
a delusion that the Holocaust never occurred.5 In his delusional state, 
he believes that, to avoid a world war in which thousands will die, he 
must demonstrate to the world that the Holocaust never occurred. 
Jake becomes fixated on a particular Holocaust survivor and attempts 
to prevent the survivor from giving a public presentation about the 
survivor’s traumatic Holocaust experience by accosting and 
attempting to kidnap the survivor. Because of his delusion, Jake 
wants to try to persuade the Holocaust survivor to recant the 
survivor’s account of the Holocaust. Jake understands that battery 
and attempted kidnapping are criminal. He also recognizes that other 
members of society believe both that the Holocaust did take place 
and that assaulting this Holocaust survivor is morally wrong. 
Nonetheless, as a function of his delusion, Jake believes that he is 
engaged in meritorious moral conduct and anticipates that, if he can 
convince the world that the Holocaust did not occur, he will prevent 
the next world war and be recognized as a hero. 
                                                 
4. Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735 (2006). 
5. This hypothetical draws generally from a case in which co-author 
Jeffrey Gould testified as a forensic expert, but the authors have modified 
the facts from that case to highlight salient issues in the “wrongfulness” 
context. The defendant’s name has also been changed to protect his privacy. 
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Using the example of Jake’s case can highlight how applying 
different meanings of “wrongfulness” could lead to different results. 
With respect to one approach to the “legal wrongfulness” standard, 
because Jake understood that his conduct was generally unlawful, an 
expert could reasonably opine that Jake knew or had the substantial 
capacity to appreciate that his acts were “legally wrongful,” implying 
that he qualifies as sane. 
In contrast, applying an approach to “societal moral 
wrongfulness,” in which we assess whether Jake believed that society 
would approve of his conduct, could lead to the opposite result. From 
within Jake’s delusion (internalized view of the facts) and his 
corresponding belief that he was preventing the next world war and 
society would applaud his actions as heroic (internalized 
understanding of societal morality), an expert could conclude that 
Jake did not know or have the substantial capacity to appreciate that 
his acts were “wrongful” in contravention of society’s morals, thus 
implying that Jake qualifies as insane. 
Under an alternative approach to “societal moral wrongfulness,” 
the expert might opine that, because Jake understood that other 
members of society believed both that the Holocaust did occur and 
believed that assaulting and attempting to kidnap a Holocaust 
survivor was morally wrong, Jake did or could appreciate that the 
prevailing societal moral standard would not condone his behavior. 
The expert might view Jake’s belief about the morality of his conduct 
as reflecting only Jake’s idiosyncratic personal moral standard. 
Under these circumstances, the expert might conclude that Jake did 
know or had the substantial capacity to appreciate that society 
viewed his conduct as morally wrong, implying that Jake was sane. 
Because applying different meanings of “wrongfulness” can 
result in opposing conclusions on the issue of insanity, an expert’s 
failure to apply the appropriate definition can undermine plea 
bargaining in the case or lead to inaccurate trial testimony upon 
which the jury might rely in reaching its verdict on the defendant’s 
sanity. For forensic evaluators to conduct an insanity evaluation that 
will effectively aid the trier of fact, definitions of the term 
“wrongfulness” should be clear and accessible, and the evaluator 
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Clarifying Definitions of “Wrongfulness” 
All three categories of “wrongfulness” begin with the forensic 
evaluator and trier of fact working to understand the situation 
confronting the accused at the time of the offense through the 
accused’s eyes—in other words, using a lens incorporating any 
existing delusion or disorder as part of that perspective. This initial 
process uses the accused’s internalized view of the facts. 
For the “personal moral wrongfulness” category, this internalized 
view of the facts is paired, as the label suggests, with the accused’s 
internalized, personal view of morality. Applied to Jake’s case, as a 
result of his delusion, Jake personally believed his conduct was 
morally appropriate, suggesting that, under the “personal moral 
wrongfulness” standard, Jake did not know and did not have the 
substantial capacity to appreciate that his conduct was “wrongful,” 
implying he should be found insane. This internal-internal pairing 
produces a single homogenous category. 
In contrast, several embedded definitional variations lie within 
each of the “legal wrongfulness” and “societal moral wrongfulness” 
categories. These depend upon whether and to what extent there is a 
claim of “special knowledge,” a belief about reality that is not shared 
by society generally (in Jake’s case, his “special knowledge” was the 
delusion that the Holocaust had not occurred), and whether and to 
what extent the definitional variation views the law and morality 
from an internalized (the accused’s) or an externalized (society’s) 
perspective. 
Definitional clarity about “wrongfulness” in each of its various 
permutations is a critical first step in assisting forensic evaluators and 
triers of fact in their respective responsibilities in assessing an 
insanity claim. 
 
Options in the Face of Legal Indeterminacy 
Definitional clarity is key. But, whether the definitions are 
themselves clear, opaque, or something in between, forensic 
evaluators also need to know which definition(s) will apply in the 
case. When the applicable definition is not provided or is otherwise 
unknown to the evaluator, the forensic expert should consider the 
following options and tools.  
As an initial matter, the evaluator, directly or through counsel, as 
appropriate, could seek guidance from the trial judge. A binding 
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ruling from the trial judge defining “wrongfulness” in the case can 
supply the forensic expert a substantial measure of confidence that 
the expert’s preparation and assessment for the trial using that 
standard will prove valuable to the trier of fact. Sometimes, however, 
whether due to the procedural posture of the case or other obstacles, 
such a ruling is unavailable at the point in time that the forensic 
evaluator either prepares the report or testifies at trial. 
In the absence of judicial guidance, the forensic scientist could 
seek guidance from a retaining attorney. If the attorney knows the 
applicable standard or legal research can reasonably produce it, 
guidance from the retaining attorney can provide the necessary 
anchor for the assessment. 
When the above options are unavailable, an intrepid forensic 
expert might consult the pattern jury instructions in the jurisdiction, 
which sometimes offer accessible and comprehensive guidance on 
the issue of “wrongfulness.” Some such instructions, however, may 
not offer adequate guidance. Moreover, if the forensic expert does 
not have the requisite legal research skills and training, there are risks 
to relying on legal research, particularly in terms of its potential 
failure to reflect the most recent legislative or judicial 
pronouncements on insanity definitions and their applicability. 
If no definitive guidance is available from the options above, or, 
in an abundance of caution, in a jurisdiction that has a 
“wrongfulness” prong to its insanity standard but does not clearly 
define the type of “wrongfulness” involved, the expert should 
consider evaluating “wrongfulness” pursuant to all three of the 
primary definitions. In other words, the expert can prepare a report 
with separate sanity analyses and relevant conclusion sections for 
“legal wrongfulness,” “personal moral wrongfulness,” and “societal 
moral wrongfulness.” Both the “legal wrongfulness” and “societal 
moral wrongfulness” categories should include a discussion of any 
relevant permutations within them. In these circumstances, this 
triadic analysis may most effectively provide a foundation for a 
negotiated settlement or an expert’s later testimony in the case and 
for informing the jury about the relevant insanity analysis. Although 
this triadic approach has some potential drawbacks, it can enhance 
the forensic expert’s ability to furnish an evaluation that will be of 
service to the court, the parties, and the trier of fact when the 
applicable definition of insanity is not ascertainable before the expert 
must complete an assessment in a criminal case. 




With a systematic analysis clarifying the primary permutations of 
“wrongfulness” in the insanity context, an exploration of options for 
ascertaining the applicable definition(s) for a given criminal case, 
and a proposal for a triadic analysis when the expert cannot decipher 
the applicable standard, forensic scientists should be better equipped 
to guide the trier of fact in evaluating “wrongfulness” in insanity 
claims.  
 
 
 
